Trump, or the breaking of diplomatic codes in political language
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.55595/0tfqsh83Keywords:
Donald Trump, diplomacy, discourse analysis, pragmatics, political communication, ethos, social networks, normative rupture.Abstract
International diplomacy has been built since Callières and Nicolson around durable norms: lexical caution, enunciative neutrality, and institutional courtesy. Donald Trump’s election to the presidency of the United States in January 2017 upended these centuries-old conventions by imposing a personalized, confrontational, and intensely mediatized communication style, driven notably by an unprecedented use of Twitter (now X). This article examines this unprecedented rupture in diplomatic language. The objective of this research is to identify the linguistic, pragmatic, and argumentative mechanisms through which Trump’s discourse transgresses the classical diplomatic communication contract theorized by Charaudeau, and to assess whether this transgression reflects a passing individual style or a deeper shift in political language in the digital age. Four hypotheses guide the study: the substitution of intentional verbal confrontation for classical diplomatic courtesy; the rise of an immediate, emotional, and disintermediated diplomacy driven by social media; lexical simplification spectacularizing diplomatic discourse; and personalization turning interstate relations into interactions between leaders. Methodologically, the study adopts a qualitative discourse-analysis approach applied to a corpus of presidential speeches, official statements, Twitter/X posts, and press conference transcripts covering 2017-2025. Five complementary theoretical frameworks structure the analysis - discourse analysis, enunciation theory, linguistic pragmatics, argumentative rhetoric, and critical discourse analysis - applied across five levels: lexical, enunciative, pragmatic, argumentative, and stylistic. The findings confirm all four hypotheses. Trump’s discourse replaces diplomatic courtesy with a centrality of the first person, personal attacks, and face-threatening acts, serving an ethos of the strong leader, protector, and fighter, sustained by a pathos of fear and national pride. Social media amplify this diplomacy of immediacy, while lexical simplification and binary oppositions spectacularize public debate. Far from accidental, this rupture proves to be a deliberate strategy of discursive chaos, with the Iranian case illustrating the use of maximal threat as a negotiating tool, and its exercise remaining a privilege of hegemonic powers. Ultimately, the Trumpian rupture reveals a lasting transformation of political communication in the digital age and calls for rethinking the boundary between domestic discourse and international diplomacy.
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Corpus sélectif
Le corpus primaire de cette étude est constitué de déclarations publiques de Donald Trump relevant de la communication diplomatique, sélectionnées pour leur représentativité des mécanismes de rupture analysés. Il couvre deux mandats présidentiels (2017-2021 ; 2025-2026) et inclut trois types de sources : discours institutionnels, publications sur plateformes numériques et interactions diplomatiques directes.
I. Discours et déclarations institutionnels
Trump, D. (juillet 2016). Discours d'investiture républicaine. Cleveland, Ohio. [Citation analysée : « I alone can fix it. »]
Trump, D. (19 septembre 2017). Discours devant l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies. New York. [Citations analysées : désignation de Kim Jong-un comme « Little Rocket Man » ; menace de « totally destroy North Korea »]
Trump, D. (28 février 2025). Rencontre diplomatique avec le président Zelensky. Maison-Blanche, Washington. [Interaction analysée pour l'usage du registre de réprimande publique en contexte diplomatique]
Trump, D. (2 avril 2026). Allocution télévisée sur la crise iranienne. [Citation analysée : « We are going to bring them back to the Stone Ages, where they belong. »]
II. Publications sur Twitter (2015-2021)
Trump, D. (novembre 2015). Déclaration à MSNBC. [Citation : « I know more than the generals. »]
Trump, D. (mai 2016). Déclaration à The Hill. [Citation : « Nobody knows trade better than me. »]
Trump, D. (2018). Tweet [@realDonaldTrump]. Twitter. [Citation : « Nobody has been tougher on China than me. »]
Trump, D. (19 mai 2019). Tweet [@realDonaldTrump]. Twitter. [Citation : « If Iran wants to fight, that will be the official end of Iran. Never threaten the United States again! »]
Trump, D. (3 janvier 2020). Tweet [@realDonaldTrump] — réaction à l'élimination du général Qassem Soleimani. Twitter. [Citations : « He should have been taken out many years ago! » ; « Iran never won a war, but never lost a negotiation! »]
Trump, D. (4 janvier 2020). Tweet [@realDonaldTrump] — menace sur les 52 sites iraniens. Twitter. [Citation : déclaration ciblant explicitement des sites « important to Iran & the Iranian culture », en violation potentielle de la Convention de La Haye (1954)]
Trump, D. (5 janvier 2020). Tweet [@realDonaldTrump] — notification officielle au Congrès. Twitter. [Citation : « These Media Posts will serve as notification to the United States Congress that should Iran strike any U.S. person or target, the United States will quickly & fully strike back, & perhaps in a disproportionate manner. »]
III. Publications sur Truth Social (2025-2026)
Trump, D. (21 mars 2026). Publication [@realDonaldTrump]. Truth Social. [Déclaration analysée : menace d'« oblitérer » les centrales électriques iraniennes si le détroit d'Ormuz n'est pas rouvert]
Trump, D. (30 mars 2026). Publication [@realDonaldTrump]. Truth Social. [Déclaration analysée : menace de « blowing up and completely obliterating » puits de pétrole, infrastructures et l'île de Kharg]
Trump, D. (7 avril 2026). Publication [@realDonaldTrump]. Truth Social. [Citation analysée : « A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again. I don't want that to happen, but it probably will. » qualifiée de possible menace génocidaire par Amnesty International]
IV. Sources secondaires du corpus
Amnesty International (2026, avril). Iran : President Trump's apocalyptic threats of large-scale civilian devastation demand urgent global action. Déclaration officielle. Londres : Amnesty International.
Al-Jazeera (2026, 7 avril). Trump on Iran: 'A whole civilisation will die tonight'. Reportage. Doha : Al Jazeera Media Network.
PBS NewsHour (2026, 8 avril). How Trump went from threatening Iran's annihilation to agreeing to a two-week ceasefire in a day. Reportage. Washington : PBS.
CNBC (2026, 28 juin). Iran talks stall after fighting erupts, Trump threatens annihilation. Reportage. New York : CNBC.
Notes bibliographiques
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